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11 Introduction
Today it is widely accepted that education and innovation are the two most impor-
tant engines of per-capita economic growth. In his pioneering contribution to the
New Growth Theory, Lucas (1988) has emphasized the accumulation of workers’
human-capital by education as a decisive source of endogenous growth. Empirical
work by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Barro (2001), and Hanushek and Wo¨ßmann
(2008) has confirmed that the quantity and even more the quality of schooling and
education are positively related to economic growth. Since the early nineties, how-
ever, endogenous growth theory is dominated by R&D-based growth models where
innovation dynamics serve as engine of growth. Romer (1990), Grossman (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998, 2005) have
been the first to explain long-run per-capita growth by intentional R&D activities of
private firms. According to these first-generation R&D-based growth models, tech-
nological change results either from an endless sequence of vertical improvements of
consumer or intermediate goods or from a continuing horizontal expansion of the
variety of goods.
The R&D-based growth models of the first generation share a common property
which is well-known as the “scale effect”. This effect predicts that larger economies
grow faster and that population growth causes increasing per-capita growth rates.
The counterfactual result of increasing growth rates persists when unskilled labor
is replaced by skilled labor and population growth is replaced by human-capital
growth. For this reason, no successful attempts have been made to integrate the
Lucas (1988) mechanism of human-capital accumulation into the first-generation
R&D-based growth models. Instead, education on the one hand and innovation on
the other have been treated as two alternative and independent engines of economic
growth (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).
In the mid-nineties, Jones (1995a) has presented an influential empirical study on
the scale effect. In response to the expressed “Jones critique”, a new class of semi-
endogenous growth models has emerged (see, e.g., Jones 1995b, 2002, Kortum 1997,
Segerstrom 1998). As a distinguishing feature, these second-generation R&D-based
growth models remove the scale effect by the assumption that the difficulty of R&D
increases over time, and instead imply that per-capita growth depends proportion-
ally on the exogenously given population growth rate. As a consequence, constant
2population leads to an equilibrium characterized by a steady state without innova-
tion and growth dynamics. We do not share this pessimistic view on technological
progress in the future. Our assessment is in line with the empirical evidence which
is certainly not in favor of the semi-endogenous growth models (see, e.g., the dis-
cussion in Zachariadis 2003, Laincz and Peretto 2006, Ha and Howitt 2007, Madsen
2008, and Venturini 2012). Thus, theoretical and empirical reasons lead us refrain
from the semi-endogenous growth theory. Instead, we prefer the scale-invariant, fully
endogenous R&D-based growth models of the third and newest generation.1 As in
the semi-endogenous growth theory, the scale effect is removed by an increasing dif-
ficulty of R&D, but this deterioration of technological opportunities is compensated
by a continuous improvement of researchers’ human capital.
This paper takes into account the close interplay of education and innovation in
driving economic growth. Some promising attempts in this direction have been made.
Arnold (1998) and Blackburn, Hung and Pozzolo (2000) have integrated education
in Romer’s (1990) variety-expansion model, whereas Arnold (2002), Stadler (2003,
2012, 2013), Strulik (2005), and Chu et al. (2013) have incorporated education and
skill acquisition in the quality-upgrading model of Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b).
Since we are interested in the stochastic dynamics of innovation, technology transfer
and industrial development, we restrict our analysis to the quality-ladder approach
of the Schumpeterian growth theory which associates innovation and growth with a
process of creative destruction, as was emphasized by Schumpeter (1942).
Of course, the theoretical analysis of R&D-based growth is not restricted to closed
economies. Earlier work has already combined quality-ladder models of all three
generations with the New Trade Theory which builds heavily on the theory of Indus-
trial Organization. To mention just a few examples, Grossman and Helpman (1990,
1991a) have integrated their first-generation R&D-based growth model into the tra-
ditional framework of international trade. Among several other studies, Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2007, 2010) have analyzed North-South trade and international
product cycles within various semi-endogenous growth models of the second gener-
ation. Stadler (2007) has modified this intriguing class of North-South trade models
by replacing exogenous population growth by endogenous human-capital accumula-
tion. This reformulation defines his model as Schumpeterian growth model of the
1The basic structure of the alternative versions of fully endogenous growth models of the third
generation is presented in Jones (1999).
3third generation. Accordingly, the present paper extends the analysis to a class of
unified general-equilibrium models of education, innovation and technology transfer
in the global economy in order to explain the dynamics of industrial development
and aggregate growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model
of education and innovation in a closed economy. We derive the balanced path of
endogenous scale-invariant growth and show that fundamental scientific discover-
ies will inevitably induce innovation clusters across industries imposing aggregate
growth cycles. Section 3 opens the economy and analyzes international product cy-
cles with quality innovations realized by firms in the developed North and imitations
realized by firms in the developing South. This allows us to analyze the dynamics
of international technology transfer by imitation. Section 4 studies an alternative
channel of technology transfer from North to South via foreign direct investment by
multinational firms. We compare the complementary models with respect to the in-
fluence of globalization and the strength of protection of intellectual property rights.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Education, Innovation and Growth
According to the latest generation of scale-invariant growth models we consider an
economy consisting of a continuum of firms, each producing a differentiated con-
sumer good. The goods are sold to households who have preferences for quantity
and quality. Each household is endowed with one unit of (raw) labor and can in-
crease skills by accumulating its human capital.
Education and Consumer Spending
Households share identical preferences and maximize their discounted utility
U(C) =
∫
∞
0
e−ρt lnC dt , (2.1)
where ρ > 0 is the constant discount rate and
C =
[∫ 1
0
φ(j)1−αq(j)α dj
]1/α
, 0 < α < 1 (2.2)
4is a quality-augmented Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index which measures instanta-
neous utility. It reflects the households’ preferences for quantity q(j) and quality φ(j)
of the demanded products available from a continuum of industries j indexed on the
unit interval [0, 1].2 According to these preferences, the elasticity of substitution
between any two products across industries is given by 1/(1− α).
Utility maximization follows two steps. First, the across-industry optimization prob-
lem is solved at each point in time. Maximizing the consumption index (2.2) subject
to the budget constraint
I =
∫ 1
0
p(j)q(j) dj ,
where I denotes consumer spending and p(j) is the price of product j, yields the
individual consumer’s demand functions
q(j) =
φ(j)p(j)−
1
1−α I∫ 1
0
φ(j)p(j)−
α
1−α dj
(2.3)
for all products j ∈ [0, 1]. The consumption index (2.2) can then be rewritten as
C = I/PC , (2.4)
where PC ≡
[∫ 1
0
φ(j)p(j)−
α
1−α dj
]
−
1−α
α
is the quality-adjusted price index of con-
sumer goods.
Second, the dynamic optimization problem is solved by maximizing the individual
consumer’s discounted utility. Households supply human capital H to production,
R&D, and education. By devoting the share θ of human capital to work in the
production and research sectors, they face the dynamic budget constraint
A˙ = rA+ wθH − I , (2.5)
where A denotes the value of a household’s asset holdings, r is the interest rate and
w is the wage rate for each unit of human capital which is normalized to w = 1.
2This specification of the consumption index is widely used in the R&D-based growth litera-
ture (see, e.g., Thompson and Waldo 1994, Dinopoulos and Thompson 1998, Li 2001, 2003, and
Segerstrom 2007).
5By devoting the remaining share (1− θ) of human capital to education, households
raise their human capital according to the Uzawa-Lucas technology
H˙ = κ(1− θ)H − δH , (2.6)
where κ(> δ + ρ) denotes the effectiveness of the educational system and δ is the
constant depreciation rate of human capital. Thus, each household maximizes its
discounted utility (2.1), given (2.4), subject to the dynamic budget constraint (2.5)
and the accumulation function (2.6).
The current-value Hamiltonian of this control problem is given by
H = ln I − lnPC + ψ1[rA+ θH − I] + ψ2[(κ(1− θ)− δ)H ]
where ψ1 and ψ2 are the costate variables of the states A and H , respectively. The
necessary first-order conditions are
HI = 1/I − ψ1 = 0 , (2.7)
HA = ψ1r = ψ1ρ− ψ˙1 , (2.8)
Hθ = ψ1H − ψ2κH = 0 , (2.9)
HH = ψ1θ + ψ2(κ(1− θ)− δ) = ψ2ρ− ψ˙2 . (2.10)
Conditions (2.7) and (2.8) lead to the Keynes-Ramsey rule
I˙/I = r − ρ ,
which explains the growth rate of consumer spending by the difference between the
interest rate and the discount rate. Further, we derive from (2.9) and (2.10) the
costates’ growth rates
ψ˙1/ψ1 = ψ˙2/ψ2 = −(κ− δ − ρ)
and hence from (2.8) the interest rate
r = κ− δ , (2.11)
6such that the Keynes-Ramsey rule can be expressed as
I˙/I = κ− δ − ρ . (2.12)
The larger the effectiveness of education κ and the lower the depreciation and dis-
count rates δ and ρ, the larger is the growth rate of consumer spending.3
The Product Markets
In each industry, the products’ quality grades are arrayed along the equidistant
rungs of a quality ladder which is assumed to be equal across industries.4 Each new
generation of products provides a quality level, λ times higher than the previous
one, where the upgrading factor λ > 1 is exogenously given.
The quality level of the top-of-the-line product in industry j is
φ(j) = λ˜m(j) , (2.13)
where λ˜ = λα/(1−α) is an alternative measure of innovation size and m(j) is the
number of sequential upgrading innovations in industry j up to the present time.
All existing consumer goods are produced subject to a constant returns to scale
technology with skilled labor as the single input. There is a fixed mass L of house-
holds which supply human-capital in exchange for wage payments. One unit of skill-
adjusted labor, LH , produces one unit of output, regardless of the quality level.
Therefore, each firm has a constant marginal cost which is equal to the wage rate
w = 1, and the supplier of the highest quality of variety j maximizes the flow of
profits
π(j) = (p(j)− 1)q(j)L .
The price-setting behavior of a quality leader depends on the underlying industry
structure which in turn depends on the technological conditions. In the present
paper, we restrict our analysis to the case of drastic innovations such that the quality
3For an analysis of the impact of education subsidies, see, e.g., Stadler (2012).
4An extension of the presented model allowing for different distances of the rungs within and
across industries is analyzed in Stadler (2013), where the distances are Pareto-distributed as sug-
gested by Minniti, Parello and Segerstrom (2013).
7leaders find it optimal to charge monopoly prices. The constant price elasticity of
demand, −1/(1−α), implies monopolistic competition at prices p(j) = p = 1/α < λ,
being equal across all industries.5
Since all quality leaders charge identical prices, we obtain from (2.3) a firm’s demand
function
Q(j) = αILφ(j)/Φ , (2.14)
where Φ =
∫ 1
0
φ(j) dj is the average quality of all products currently produced by
the incumbent firms. All quality leaders realize the flow of profit
π(j) = (1− α)ILφ(j)/Φ , (2.15)
which differs across industries with respect to the relative quality level φ(j)/Φ. This
heterogeneity provides an incentive for challengers to engage in R&D activities in
the most progressive industries.
Innovation Dynamics
The quality of consumer goods is upgraded by a sequence of product innovations,
each building on its predecessors. The opportunity of realizing profits drives potential
entrants to engage in risky R&D projects in order to develop higher-quality products.
The first firm to succeed in developing the next higher-quality product in an industry
is granted an infinitely-lived patent for the new technology. Competition therefore
takes the form of an endless sequence of patent races between an arbitrary number of
challenger firms.6 Any quality innovation opens up the opportunity for all challenger
firms to search for the next higher quality innovation in this industry. This reflects
an external spillover effect of technological knowledge since even laggard firms can
equally participate in each patent race without having climbed all of the rungs of
the quality ladder themselves. Every firm may target its research efforts at any of
the continuum of state-of-the-art products, i.e., it may engage in any industry. If a
5In case of non-drastic innovations, the leading firms find it optimal to charge the limit price
p = λ = λ˜(1−α)/α. When innovation sizes are random, both types of price-setting behavior occur
in different industries at the same time.
6It can be shown that incumbent firms have no incentive to engage in R&D activities in their
own industries (see, e.g., Li 2001). This is the reason for every quality leader to be one step ahead.
8firm i undertakes R&D at intensity hi(j) for an infinitesimal time interval dt, then it
will succeed in taking the next step up the quality ladder for the targeted product j
with probability hi(j)dt. This implies that the number of realized innovations m(j)
in each industry j follows a Poisson process with the arrival rate h(j) =
∑
i hi(j).
The industry-specific innovation rate
h(j) =
Lh(j)H
µφ(j)
(2.16)
is assumed to depend proportionally on the amount of human capital Lh(j)H de-
voted to R&D activities in industry j. The inverse of the parameter µ relates the
productivity of human capital in R&D relative to its (normalized) productivity in
production and is assumed to be equal across industries. The term φ(j) reflects a
negative externality of the number of industry specific innovations in the past by
indicating that the realization of further innovations becomes progressively more
difficult as the quality level increases. This effect provides a disincentive for chal-
lengers to engage in R&D activities in the most progressiv industries which exactly
compensates for the higher-profit incentive discussed above.
The Stock Market
The expected discounted profits of a challenger firm winning a patent race in indus-
try j is the stock market value Vm(j)+1(j). To participate in an innovation race, firms
have to employ human capital in their research labs. According to (2.16), a challenger
i who devotes Lh,i(j)H units of human capital to R&D at a cost of Lh,i(j)H for an
infinitesimal time interval dt attains the stock-market value Vm(j)+1(j) with proba-
bility [Lh,i(j)H/(µφ(j))]dt. He can finance R&D activities by issuing equity claims
which yield nothing in case that the research effort fails but entitle the claimants
to the flow of dividends πm(j)+1(j) if the effort succeeds.
7 Omitting the uninterest-
ing case where firms undertake no R&D at all, free entry into each innovation race
implies Vm(j)+1(j) = λ˜V (j) = µφ(j) such that
8
V (j) = µφ(j)/λ˜ . (2.17)
7The impact of a cash-in-advance constraint on R&D investment is analyzed in Chu and Cozzi
(2014).
8We omit the current quality-level index m(j) for brevity.
9Since the quality level φ(j) is constant during every race and only jumping up to
λ˜φ(j) whenever an innovation occurs, it follows that the firm value V (j) is also con-
stant during every innovation race. Every time the quality level increases, however,
R&D in the respective industry becomes more difficult implying that the reward
for innovating must correspondingly increase to induce further R&D activities of
challengers in this industry.
Since there is a continuum of industries and the returns from engaging in innova-
tion races are independently distributed across firms and industries, each household
investor minimizes risk by holding a diversified portfolio of stocks. Absence of arbi-
trage opportunities implies that the expected return on equities of innovators must
equal the return on an equal size investment in a riskless bond, i.e.,
π(j)/V (j)− h(j) = r , (2.18)
where the expected rate of return on equities of innovators consists of the dividend
rates and the risk of losing the dividends due to another firm’s quality innovation in
the future.
By substituting (2.11), (2.15) and (2.17) into (2.18) we obtain the no-arbitrage
condition
h(j) + κ− δ = (1− α)λ˜IL/(µΦ) ,
from which we conclude that innovation rates are equal across industries, i.e., h(j) =
h ∀ j .
Industrial Dynamics and Quality Growth
The average quality of the top-of-the-line consumer products is Φ =
∫ 1
0
φ(j) dj.
Due to (2.13) the quality of product j jumps up from φ(j) to λ˜φ(j) whenever an
innovation occurs. Since the innovation rate h is equal across industries, the time
derivative of the average quality index is
Φ˙ =
∫ 1
0
(λ˜− 1)φ(j)h dj = (λ˜− 1)hΦ ,
such that its growth rate
Φ˙/Φ = (λ˜− 1)h (2.19)
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depends proportionally on the innovation rate.
The Labor Market
The labor market is perfectly competitive. The share (1 − θ) of workers’ human
capital is devoted to education. The remaining amount of human capital is employed
either in production or in R&D. It follows from (2.14) that the aggregate demand
for human capital in the production sector is
LqH =
∫ 1
0
Q(j)dj = αIL ,
and from (2.16) that the aggregate demand in the research sector amounts to
LhH =
∫ 1
0
µhφ(j) dj = µhΦ .
Thus, full employment of workers implies
LH = (1− θ)LH + αIL+ µhΦ . (2.20)
This labor-market clearing condition will be used to analyze the balanced-growth
equilibrium for a given level of scientific knowledge and to study growth cycles in
response to fundamental scientific discoveries.
The Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
First, we solve the model for a balanced-growth path as an equilibrium path in which
all endogenous aggregate variables grow at a constant rate over time. We conclude
from (2.6), (2.12) and (2.20) that
H˙/H = κ(1− θ)− δ = I˙/I = κ− δ − ρ ,
implying a constant share of human capital
1− θ = 1− ρ/κ (2.21)
devoted to education. It depends positively on the effectiveness of the educational
system but negatively on the discount rate. This is the basic growth mechanism as
11
has been emphasized by Lucas (1988). We further conclude from (2.12), (2.19) and
(2.20) that
Φ˙/Φ = (λ˜− 1)h = I˙/I = κ− δ − ρ .
The steady-state innovation rate is therefore determined as
h∗ = (κ− δ − ρ)/(λ˜− 1) . (2.22)
In contrast to predecessor models of R&D-based economic growth, the steady-state
innovation rate neither depends on the exogenous labor force as in the scale-variant
growth models of Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and
Stokey (1995) nor on the population growth rate as in the semi-endogenous growth
model of Segerstrom (1998). Instead, economic growth is endogenously explained in
terms of educational and technological parameters. Education and innovation are
closely related to each other. The realization of innovations becomes progressively
more difficult as technology evolves, but researchers compensate for this deteriora-
tion of technological opportunities by continuously improving their skills. Education
and innovation appear as in-line engines of economic growth.
Given (2.19) and (2.22), the consumption index (2.4) reads
C = αΦ(1−α)/αI
and grows at the scale-invariant rate
C˙/C = (1/α)(κ− δ − ρ) ,
which can be decomposed into quantity growth at rate κ− δ−ρ and quality growth
at rate (1/α− 1)(κ− δ − ρ).
Proposition 1: The long-run innovation rate of the economy depends positively on
the effectiveness of education and human-capital accumulation but negatively on the
innovation size and the depreciation and discount rates. Education and innovation
are the two in-line engines of scale-invariant economic growth.
Whereas the technological development in any particular industry evolves stochas-
tically, the economy at the aggregate level experiences smooth and non-random
processes of human-capital accumulation, innovation and growth.
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Scientific Discoveries, Innovation Clusters and Growth Cycles
We now consider a certain point in time where technological opportunities improve,
triggered for example by a fundamental scientific discovery. Stadler (2013) has ex-
tended the framework of the presented model by adding a Poisson jump process
to the movement equation (2.6) of human capital. To illustrate the consequences
of such a jump, let us instead consider a single downward jump of parameter µ,
reflecting an upward shift of R&D productivity.9
Since neither human capital LH nor the quality index Φ can increase discontinuously,
it is obvious from (2.20) that the innovation rates h jump up such that aggregate
labor demand in the R&D sector remains constant. A cluster of innovations across
industries occurs since the pace of technological progress in all industries accelerates.
In response to the higher innovation rates, the quality index Φ grows at a higher rate.
It follows from the labor-market clearing condition (2.20) that the sum of growth
rates of h and Φ must equal the growth rate of H , implying that
h˙/h+ (λ˜− 1)h = κ− δ − ρ .
Substituting the steady-state innovation rate h∗ from (2.22) leads to the non-linear
first-order differential equation
h˙/h = − (λ˜− 1)(h− h∗) < 0 ,
which describes a declining adjustment path of the innovation rate h which converges
to the steady-state value h∗ when time approaches infinity and no further scientific
discovery appears. However, as soon as a further scientific discovery occurs, the
innovation rates jump up again and, hence, initialize a new growth cycle, as is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Proposition 2: Scientific discoveries lead to a temporary increase in the innovation
and growth rates of the economy, thereby inducing innovation clusters across indus-
tries and generating growth cycles.
If patent protection is imperfect, rival firms are able to imitate the top-of-the-line
products. In case of Bertrand competition, entry of imitating firms reduces the flow
9A similar mechanism forms the basis for models on general-purpose technologies (see, e.g.,
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998, Bresnahan 2010, and Carlaw
and Lipsey 2006, 2011).
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Figure 1: Innovation Clusters and Growth Cycles
h
t
h∗
of profits for all incumbent firms to zero. Therefore, under the assumptions holding
so far, there is no incentive for firms to engage in imitative activities. However, under
more general assumptions it may be profitable for firms to imitate. At least three
extensions in this direction are discussed in the literature. First, if the discount factor
is sufficiently high, a subgame perfect equilibrium may exist where quality leaders
collude and share monopoly profits (see, e.g., Segerstrom 1991, Houser 1998 and
Cheng and Tao 1999). Second, imitation of the state-of-the-art technology may be
a necessary precondition for firms to participate in the next innovation race (see,
e.g., Mukoyama 2003). Third, imitation may be profitable if the copying firm is able
to produce at a lower unit cost. This is obviously the case if the imitating firm is
located in another country or region which is characterized by a lower wage rate.
The next step is therefore to open the economy and to analyze international product
cycles characterized by sequences of innovation and imitation.
3 Innovation, Imitation and International Prod-
uct Cycles
The observation that innovative goods are manufactured in a developed country
(the North) until production is relocated to a less developed country (the South),
14
has been the basis for Vernon’s (1966) product-cycle theory of international trade.
As he claimed, innovative goods are developed and produced in the North until
the underlying production technologies are standardized. At this point in time, the
production of goods shifts to the less developed South where the wage rate is lower.
A product’s life comes to its end and a new cycle begins when the product is replaced
by a higher-quality one, again developed in the North.
Krugman (1979) has been the first to formalize North-South trade in this spirit,
albeit with an exogenous rate of innovation in the North and an exogenous rate of
technology transfer to the South. Therefore, his model is concerned with the effects
of innovation and imitation, but not with their causes. Models with endogenous inno-
vation by profit-maximizing firms in the North have been presented by Segerstrom,
Anant and Dinopoulos (1990), Helpman (1993), and Lai (1998). However, since tech-
nology transfer is assumed to be costless in these models, they cannot account for
endogenous imitation by profit-maximizing firms in the South.
Grossman and Helpman (1991c) have developed a model of interrelated innova-
tion and imitation processes by profit-maximizing firms in the North and the South
which, however, cannot capture a sequence of product cycles in a particular indus-
try since innovative activities are directed to variety expansion via the creation of
new industries. In a complementary article, Grossman and Helpman (1991d) have
presented a complementary model with quality improvements instead of variety ex-
pansion. This seminal model generates stochastic North-South product cycles as the
result of a continuing process of innovation and imitation within each single indus-
try. Both versions of the Grossman and Helpman North-South trade model belong
to the R&D-based growth models of the first generation.
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) have extended the Grossman and Helpman (1991c)
model of North-South product cycles to a semi-endogenous growth model of the sec-
ond generation. In their model, the single driving force for innovation and growth
is a positive rate of world-population growth which is not only assumed to be time-
invariant, but also exogenously given and identical in the North and the South. The
increasing labor force goes along with an increasing difficulty of realizing innovations
such that the model generates a constant steady-state innovation rate. However, this
scenario is rather unrealistic. In fact, population growth rates in the Northern and
Southern countries differ to a large extent and decline over time, taking zero or even
negative values in some Northern countries. The balanced population-growth prop-
15
erty is also theoretically fragile. It can be shown that without population growth, the
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) model generates a stationary equilibrium without
innovation, imitation and economic growth.
To avoid this shortcoming, which is common to all semi-endogenous growth models,
Stadler (2007) has extended the Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) approach by
considering the skill acquisition of workers in order to replace exogenous population
growth by endogenous human-capital accumulation. This modification prevents the
global economy from reaching a steady state without technological dynamics when
the population growth goes down to zero. In the following, we present that extended
version of the Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) North-South trade model to study
the industrial dynamics and aggregate growth in a global economy.
The Product Markets
We consider a world economy consisting of two countries or regions, the North and
the South, indexed by ι ∈ {N, S}. The North consists of the developed countries,
whereas the South consists of those developing countries which have already joined
the world trading system and participate in free trade without restriction.
The global economy is populated by a fixed measure of households in the North,
LN , and in the South, LS. Human capital per capita is HN in the North and HS
in the South, such that (LNHN + LSHS) is the global supply of human capital.
As already stated in Section 2, households share identical preferences and maximize
their discounted utility (2.1), subject to their budget constraints, such that
qι(j) =
φ(j)p(j)−
1
1−α I ι∫ 1
0
φ(j)p(j)−
α
1−α dj
, ι = N, S . (3.1)
The production technologies in both regions coincide. However, each firm in the
North has a constant unit cost equal to wN and each firm in the South has a
constant unit cost equal to wS. We normalize the wage rate in the South, such that
the relative wage ω = wN/wS is constant on a balanced growth path.
As in Section 2, we restrict our analysis to the case of drastic innovations, i.e.,
1/α < λ. This implies that all Northern quality leaders charge the unconstrained
monopoly price pN(j) = pN = (1/α)wN .10 Hence, we derive from (3.1) each Northern
10The condition (1/α)wN < λwS is sufficient to generate this price-setting behavior.
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firm’s demand function
QN(j) = φ(j)(pN)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) , (3.2)
where PC is the quality-adjusted price index as defined in (2.4), and the flow of
profits
πN(j) = (1/α− 1)wNφ(j)(pN)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) (3.3)
from selling to Northern and Southern consumers.
A Southern firm that succeeds in imitating the quality of a top-of-the-line product
manufactured by a Northern firm gains a cost advantage over the Northern competi-
tor if wN > wS, which will be assumed to hold in the steady-state equilibrium. The
copying firm is assumed to undercut the price of the previous Northern producer by
setting the unconstrained monopoly price pS(j) = pS = (1/α)wS.11 From (3.1) we
derive each Southern firm’s demand function
QS(j) = φ(j)(pS)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) (3.4)
and the flow of profits
πS(j) = (1/α− 1)wSφ(j)(pS)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) . (3.5)
We now turn to the dynamics of technological progress in the North and the transfer
of the improved technologies to the South.
Dynamics of Innovation and Imitation
R&D competition takes the form of stochastic innovation races between Northern
firms. The number of innovations realized in each industry j follows a Poisson process
with the arrival rate h(j) =
∑
i hi(j) which is specified according to (2.16) as
h(j) =
LNh (j)H
N
µφ(j)
. (3.6)
Firms in the South are assumed to undertake only imitative research targeted at
imitating the quality of the top-of-the-line products which are actually produced
11The condition (1/α)wS < wN is sufficient to generate this price-setting behavior.
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in the North. Corresponding to the innovation races, this kind of competition is
assumed to take the form of stochastic imitation races between Southern firms.
Each Southern firm i may target its imitative activities at any of the state-of-the-art
products currently manufactured in the North. If it undertakes imitative activities
at intensity ki(j) for an infinitesimal time interval dt, it will succeed in copying
the targeted product j with probability ki(j)dt. This implies that the number of
imitations realized in each industry j follows a Poisson process with the arrival rate
k(j) =
∑
i ki(j), given by
k(j) =
LSk (j)H
S
νφ(j)
, (3.7)
where ν is a measure of the technological difficulty in realizing an imitation and
is closely related to the strength of protection of intellectual property rights. The
arrival rate of imitations is assumed to depend proportionally on the amount of
human capital LSk (j)H
S devoted to imitative activities. The presence of the term
φ(j) again reflects a negative externality of the technology level reached in industry
j in the past.
The Global Stock Market
The expected discounted flow of profits of a Northern challenger winning an innova-
tion race is the stock market value V Nm(j)+1(j). To participate in an innovation race,
Northern firms have to employ workers’ human capital in their research labs. As
derived in (2.17), free entry into each innovation race implies
V N(j) = µwNφ(j)/λ˜ . (3.8)
The firm value V N(j) is constant during an innovation race until the next innovation
of a Northern firm or an imitation of a Southern firm occurs. This leads to the no-
arbitrage condition
πN(j)/V N (j)− h(j)− k(j) = r . (3.9)
By substituting (2.11), (3.3) and (3.8) into (3.9) we obtain
h(j) + k(j) + κ− δ = (1/α− 1)µ−1λ˜(pN)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) . (3.10)
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In the South, free entry into each imitation race implies
V S(j) = νwSφ(j) (3.11)
and the no-arbitrage condition reads
πS(j)/V S(j)− h(j) = r . (3.12)
The product manufactured by a Southern incumbent will not be imitated by another
Southern firm since there is no reward for copying already copied products under
Bertrand competition. By substituting (2.11), (3.5), and (3.11) into (3.12) we obtain
h(j) + κ− δ = (1/α− 1)ν−1(pS)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) . (3.13)
It can be concluded successively from (3.13) and (3.10) that both, innovation and
imitation rates, are equal across industries, i.e., h(j) = h and k(j) = k ∀ j.
To solve for the relative product price in the North, we divide (3.13) by (3.10) to
obtain
pN
pS
=
wN
wS
= ω =
(
νλ˜(h+ κ− δ)
µ(h+ k + κ− δ)
)1−α
, (3.14)
which is increasing in the rate of innovation but decreasing in the rate of imitation.
As noted in footnote 11 above, we have to assume that ω > 1/α.
Industrial Dynamics and Quality Growth
At each point in time, a share nN of industries, called “N -industries” have North-
ern incumbents and a share nS of industries, called “S-industries” have Southern
incumbents whereby nN + nS = 1. Northern firms undertake innovative activities
in all industries while Southern firms undertake imitative activities only in the N -
industries where production is currently in the North. Due to Bertrand competition,
imitations in the S-industries would not be profitable. However, if a Southern firm is
successful in imitating the product of a Northern quality leader, production shifts to
the South because the unit cost of production is lower there. As soon as a Northern
firm is successful in a quality innovation of a product which is currently manufac-
tured in the South, production shifts back to the North. As is illustrated in Figure
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2, each product switches randomly across the two types of industries with transition
probabilities depending on the Poisson arrival rates associated with innovative and
imitative activities.
Figure 2: Innovation, Imitation and Industrial Dynamics
N-industries S-industries
k
h
h
Since nN is constant over time in a steady-state equilibrium, the flow into the N -
industries must equal the flow out of the N -industries, i.e. nSh = nNk, such that
nN =
h
h+ k
; nS =
k
h + k
. (3.15)
The share of industries with Northern incumbents is an increasing function of the
rate of innovation and a decreasing function of the rate of imitation. The opposite
holds for the share of industries with Southern incumbents.
The average quality of all products can be decomposed to Φ = ΦN + ΦS, where
ΦN ≡
∫
nN
φ(j)dj =
∫
nN
λ˜m(j)dj
is the aggregate quality of the Northern products and
ΦS =
∫
nS
φ(j)dj =
∫
nS
λ˜m(j)dj
is the aggregate quality of the Southern products. The time derivative of ΦN is
Φ˙N =
∫
nN
(λ˜m(j)+1 − λ˜m(j)) h dj +
∫
nS
λ˜m(j)+1 h dj −
∫
nN
λ˜m(j) k dj
= (λ˜− 1)hΦN + λ˜hΦS − kΦN
and the time derivative of ΦS is
Φ˙S =
∫
nN
λ˜m(j)k dj −
∫
nS
λ˜m(j) h dj = kΦN − hΦS .
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This implies the growth rates
Φ˙N/ΦN = (λ˜− 1)h+ λ˜hΦS/ΦN − k
and
Φ˙S/ΦS = kΦN/ΦS − h .
Obviously, the growth rates of ΦN and ΦS are constant over time only if they are
equal. It follows from Φ˙N/ΦN = Φ˙S/ΦS that ΦN/ΦS = λ˜h/k and, by definition,
ΦN =
λ˜h
λ˜h+ k
Φ ; ΦS =
k
λ˜h + k
Φ , (3.16)
Using (3.15), this implies
ΦN
nN
=
λ˜(h+ k)
λ˜h+ k
Φ >
ΦS
nS
=
h+ k
λ˜h+ k
Φ ,
indicating that the average quality of products manufactured in the North is gener-
ally higher than the average quality of products manufactured in the South.
The Labor Markets
It is assumed that workers can move freely across firms and sectors within each
region but not across the regions. According to (2.21), in both regions a constant
share 1 − ρ/κ of human capital is devoted to education. The remaining amount of
human capital is devoted to production and to R&D. It follows from (3.2) that the
aggregate demand for human capital in the Northern production sector is∫
nN
LNq (j)H
Ndj =
∫
nN
QN (j)dj = ΦN (pN)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS)
and from (3.6) that the aggregate demand for human capital in the Northern research
sector amounts to∫ 1
0
LNh (j)H
Ndj =
∫ 1
0
µhφ(j)dj = µhΦ .
Thus, full employment of Northern workers implies that
LNHN = (1− ρ/κ)LNHN + ΦN(pN )−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) + µhΦ . (3.17)
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Similar calculations apply for the Southern labor market. It follows from (3.4) that
the aggregate demand for human capital in the Southern production sector is∫
nS
LSq (j)H
Sdj =
∫
nS
QS(j)dj = ΦS(pS)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) ,
and from (3.7) that the aggregate demand for human capital in the Southern research
sector is∫
nN
LSk (j)H
Sdj =
∫
nN
νkφ(j)dj = νkΦN .
Thus, full employment of Southern workers implies that
LSHS = (1− ρ/κ)LSHS + ΦS(pS)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) + νkΦN . (3.18)
The equation system (3.11), (3.14), (3.16), (3.17), and (3.18) is sufficient to solve
the model for a steady-state equilibrium.
The Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
In the balanced-growth equilibrium, the growth rates are determined by
I˙ ι/I ι = H˙ ι/H ι = (κ− δ − ρ) = Φ˙ι/Φι = Φ˙/Φ = (λ˜− 1)h ; ι = N, S ,
such that the innovation rate is again
h∗ =
κ− δ − ρ
λ˜− 1
.
The steady-state innovation rate of the open economy coincides with the one derived
in (2.22) for the closed economy. To derive the explanatory factors of the imitation
rate k, we substitute (3.10) and (3.16) into (3.17) to obtain the Northern steady-state
condition
ρ/κ = µ
Φ
LNHN
[
α
1− α
(h+ k + κ− δ)h
λ˜h+ k
+ h
]
, (3.19)
and substitute (3.13) and (3.16) into (3.18) to obtain the Southern steady-state
condition
ρ/κ = ν
Φ
LSHS
[
α
1− α
(h+ κ− δ)k
λ˜h+ k
+
λ˜hk
λ˜h + k
]
. (3.20)
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In the balanced-growth equilibrium, the innovation and imitation rates, and the
ratios Φ/HN and Φ/HS are constant over time.
The products in each industry follow stochastic life cycles with rather different his-
tories. A particular product might be manufactured in the North for a while before
a Southern firm succeeds in imitating the technology. Then production shifts to the
South where the product is manufactured until being upgraded again in the North.
Alternatively, the product might be improved several times in succession by various
Northern firms before it is imitated by a Southern firm. An appropriate measure of
the average length of a North-South product cycle is (1/k + 1/h). The first term
indicates how long, on average, a product will be produced in the North before be-
ing imitated by a Southern firm. Analogously, the second term indicates how long,
on average, a product will be manufactured by that Southern firm before being
upgraded again by a Northern innovator.
Globalization and Intellectual Property Rights
The steady-state equilibrium of the model enables us to derive some comparative-
static effects of globalization on the dynamics of innovation and imitation. Global-
ization is modeled as an expansion in the size of the South. Even if less developed,
each country joining the world trading system will increase the labor force LS. To
keep the analysis tractable, we assume that the per-capita human capital of the
joining country equals that of the already integrated countries in the South. In or-
der to concentrate on a steady-state equilibrium, we further have to assume that the
effectiveness of education, measured by education parameter κ, is equal in the North
and the South.12 However, the influence of different human-capital growth rates can
be captured within the model by a sequence of jumps in the relative stock of human
capital HS/HN .
To derive the comparative-static effects, we totally differentiate the equation system
12A smaller effectiveness parameter in the South would induce developing countries to contin-
uously fall behind the developed counties. A higher effectiveness parameter in the South would
induce developing countries to continuously catch up which would contradict the assumption of
only Northern firms being able to innovate. Of course, both alternative assumptions are not com-
patible with a balanced steady-state growth equilibrium of the global economy.
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(3.19) and (3.20). Making use of
∂
∂k
(
h+ k + κ− δ
λ˜h+ k
)
= −
ρ
(λ˜h+ k)2
< 0
and
∂
∂k
(
k
λ˜h+ k
)
=
λ˜h
(λ˜h + k)2
> 0
we obtain dk/dLS > 0 and dk/dν < 0. An increase in the size of the South LS
leads to an increase in the innovation rate. It follows from (3.19) that this in turn
increases the ratio ΦN/HN and thus implies a short-run increase in the innovation
rate. The long-run innovation rate h∗, however, is not affected by dLS.
Proposition 3: Globalization measured by an increase in the size of the South leads
to a temporary increase in the innovation rate and to a permanent increase in the
imitation rate so that the average length of a North-South product cycle decreases.
The intuition behind this result is obvious. More demand in the South increases the
rate of imitating the top-of-the-line products currently manufactured by Northern
firms. This higher rate of technology transfer implies that production is relocated
from the high-wage North to the low-wage South such that Northern workers are set
free for employment in R&D. As can be seen from (3.14), the Northern relative wage
rate falls and gives Northern firms an incentive to raise their innovative activities.
The innovation rates jump up and accelerate technological progress, but workers are
partially shifted back into production as innovation becomes more difficult as the
quality level increases. In the long run, globalization increases the fraction of North-
ern human capital devoted to R&D whereas the innovation rate remains constant.
Nowadays, the question of the strength of protection of intellectual property rights
has become an important topic in the theory of international trade. We capture a
stronger protection of intellectual property rights by an increase in the parameter ν
measuring the difficulty of imitation. The comparative statics correspond to those
of a variation of LS.
Proposition 4: Stronger protection of intellectual property rights measured by an
increase in the difficulty for Southern firms to realize imitations leads to a temporary
decrease in the innovation rate and to a permanent decrease in the imitation rate so
that the average length of a North-South product cycle increases.
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Of course, stronger protection of intellectual property rights induces Southern firms
to devote less human capital to imitative activities. The lower rate of imitation in-
creases the demand for Northern workers. The Northern relative wage rate increases
until the additional employment of human capital in production is offset by an equal
decrease in the demand for human capital in the Northern R&D labs. The innova-
tion rate temporarily declines. In the long run, however, the innovation rate remains
constant, even if a smaller fraction of Northern human capital is devoted to R&D.
Imitation is an important channel through which for the technology transfer from de-
veloped countries to developing countries. However, as examined, e.g., by Branstetter
et al. (2006), international technology transfer occurs not only across rival firms via
imitation, but also within multinational firms via foreign direct investment. Such a
complementary model of technology transfer by multinational firms is presented in
the next section.
4 Innovation and Technology Transfer via Foreign
Direct Investment
North-South trade models with technology transfer within multinational firms in-
clude Glass and Saggi (2002), Sener (2006), and Glass and Wu (2006). In these
models, however, a stronger protection of intellectual property rights leads to a
lower rate of technology transfer from North to South. The empirically observed
increase in the rate of technology transfer that results from stronger protection
is consistent with the implications of the North-South trade models developed by
Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), and Branstetter et al. (2007). However, these papers
assume that international technology adaption within multinational firms is costless
and thus cannot account for the observed increase in R&D spending by foreign af-
filiates of multinationals. Several empirical studies have documented that research
activities conducted by affiliates in developing countries is focused on the absorption
of parent-firm technology (see, e.g., Kuemmerle 1999).
Recently, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) have developed a North-South trade
model that is consistent with the above-mentioned empirical evidence. As the prede-
cessor model of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007), this model is a semi-endogenous
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R&D-based growth model. In order to develop a fully endogenous Schumpeterian
growth model of the third generation, we adopt the idea from Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010) but again replace the assumption of exogenous population growth
by endogenous human-capital accumulation. This extension allows us to present a
model of multinational firms in line with the models presented in the former sections.
As before, we consider a global economy consisting of two countries or regions: a
high-wage North and a low-wage South. Human capital is the only factor of pro-
duction and grows at an endogenous rate in both regions. It is employed in four
distinct activities: education, manufacturing of consumption goods, innovative re-
search activities and adaptive research activities. Innovations are realized by firms in
the North, adoptions are realized by firms in the South. There is free trade between
the two regions.
In this global economy, Northern firms hire workers to engage in R&D with the aim
of developing higher-quality products. A successful firm becomes a Northern quality
leader and earns global monopoly profits from producing and selling the state-of-the
art quality product in its industry. As an additional feature, compared to Section 3,
a Northern quality leader can hire Southern workers to engage in adaptive research
with the aim of transferring this technology to the low-wage South. When successful,
a firm establishes a foreign affiliate and earns even higher global monopoly profits
because of lower wages in the South. A fraction of profits is repatriated back to
the Northern stockholders. Adaptive research can be interpreted as foreign direct
investment because it represents the cost that Northern quality leaders have to incur
in order to transfer their technology to foreign affiliates. Further, Northern quality
leaders control the intensity of adaptive research such that their global profits are
maximized.
The Product Markets
Each Northern quality leader faces constant unit cost of production equal to the
Northern wage rate wN . Likewise, each foreign affiliate in the South has constant
unit cost equal to the Southern wage rate wS. We solve the model for a steady-
state equilibrium where the North has a higher wage rate than the South such that
production shifts from North to South as soon as a Northern leader is successful in
adaptive research. In addition, we assume that the quality improvement is sufficiently
large for a Northern quality leader to produce at lower quality-adjusted unit costs
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than a foreign affiliate producing a product with a quality one step below. As a
result, Northern quality leaders can drive foreign affiliates producing lower quality
products out of business even though the latter have a wage-based cost advantage.
Both, the Northern quality leaders N as well as the Southern affiliates F maxi-
mize the flow of global profits by setting the unconstrained monopoly prices, pN =
(1/α)wN and pF = (1/α)wS.
Each foreign affiliate, but not the Northern leaders, faces an exogenously given risk
that its technology becomes imitated. At each point in time, there is an instantaneous
probability k that a foreign affiliate’s product is imitated by a competitive fringe of
Southern firms S. All imitated products are produced in the South and offered at
the Bertrand price pS = wS.
This leads to firms’ demand functions
Qι(j) = φ(j) (pι)−
1
1−α P
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) , ι = N,F, S (4.1)
and the profits
πN(j) = (1/α− 1) wN φ(j) (pN)−
1
1−α P
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) (4.2)
and
πF (j) = (1/α− 1) wS φ(j) (pF )−
1
1−α P
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) . (4.3)
Due to Bertrand competition, the imitating firms in the South realize no profits such
that πS(j) = 0.
Dynamics of Innovation, Adaption and Imitation
Innovation dynamics are captured analogously to Sections 2 and 3. If Northern
challenger firms employ LNh (j)H
N units of human capital in innovative research,
they are successful in developing the next higher-quality product in industry j with
instantaneous probability
h(j) =
LNh (j)H
N
µφ(j)
. (4.4)
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The returns to R&D activities are independently distributed across firms, industries
and over time. If the foreign affiliate of a Northern quality leader employs LSℓ (j)H
S
units of human capital in adaptive research, then the Northern firm is successful in
shifting its production to the South with instantaneous probability
ℓ(j) =
LSℓ (j)H
S
ηφ(j)
, (4.5)
where η measures the difficulty of technology adaption. A Northern quality leader
is more likely to be successful in transferring its production to the South when it
employs more human capital.
The Global Stock Market
Free entry into each innovation race implies that the expected benefit from innovative
R&D must be equal to the corresponding R&D cost. This implies V Nm(j)+1(j) =
wNµλ˜φ(j) such that
V N(j) = wNµφ(j)/λ˜ . (4.6)
Foreign affiliates of Northern quality leaders engage in adaptive research. If suc-
cessful, the expected discounted profit earned by the firm is V F (j)− V N(j), where
V F (j) is the market value of the foreign affiliate after success. When a technology
transfer occurs, the foreign affiliate has to pay its Northern parent firm the royalty
payment V N (j) for the use of its technology in the South. Therefore, what matters
for adaptive research is the gain in expected discounted profits, V F (j)− V N(j). A
foreign affiliate engages in adaptive research activities if
V F (j)− V N (j) = wSηφ(j) ,
such that
V F (j) = (wNµ/λ˜+ wSη)φ(j) . (4.7)
Consumers finance both types of innovative and adaptive activity through a global
stock market. At each point in time there are two types of firms having positive stock-
market values, Northern quality leaders producing in the North, and foreign affiliates
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producing in the South. Since the returns to innovative and adaptive investments
are independent across firms, consumers can completely diversify the idiosyncratic
risk by holding a diversified portfolio of stocks. At each point in time, the rate of
return from holding any of the stocks must be the same as the rate of return r from
holding a risk-free bond. The no-arbitrage condition for holding a stock issued by
an incumbent Northern quality leader is
πN(j)/V N (j)− h(j) = r . (4.8)
Substituting (2.11), (4.2) and (4.6) into (4.8) gives
h(j) + κ− δ = (1/α− 1)µ−1λ˜(pN)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) (4.9)
such that innovation rates are equal across markets, h(j) = h. The no-arbitrage
condition for holding a stock issued by a multinational firm that produces in the
South is
πF (j)/V F (j)− h− k = r . (4.10)
Substituting (2.11), (4.3) and (4.7) into (4.10) gives
(h+ k + κ− δ)(η + ωµ/λ˜) = (1/α− 1)(pF )−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) . (4.11)
From (4.9) and (4.11) the relative prices and wages ω = wN/wS = pN/pF are
determined implicitly by the polynomial
[(h+ κ− δ)/(h+ k + κ− δ)]ω1/(1−α) − ω = ηλ˜/µ , (4.12)
The long-run innovation rate is again determined by (2.22). Then the expression on
the left hand side of (4.12) is negative at ω = 1, strictly increasing in ω for ω > 1
and approaching infinity for ω →∞.
Industrial Dynamics and Quality Growth
At each point in time, there are three types of industries in the global economy:
a share nN of N -industries where products are manufactured by Northern quality
leaders, a share nF of F -industries where products are manufactured in the South
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by foreign affiliates of multinational firms and a share nS of S-industries where
products are manufactured in the South by competitive-fringe firms. As is illustrated
in Figure 3, each product can switch randomly across these three types of industries
with transition probabilities that depend on the Poisson arrival rates associated with
innovative, adaptive and imitative activities.
Figure 3: Innovation, Adaption, Imitation, and Industrial Dynamics
N-industries F -industries S-industries
ℓ k
h
h
h
The shares of industries must be constant in a steady-state equilibrium. This implies
that the flow into the N -industries must be equal to flow out of the N -industries,
that is (nF +nS)h = nNℓ. Additionally, the flow into the S-industries must be equal
to the flow out of the S-industries, nFk = nSh. Together with the requirement that
nN + nF + nS = 1, these flow equations imply that
nN =
h
h+ ℓ
; nF =
hℓ
(h+ k)(h+ ℓ)
; nS =
kℓ
(h+ k)(h + ℓ)
. (4.13)
The average quality of all products can be decomposed into three parts, Φ = ΦN +
ΦF + ΦS, where
ΦN ≡
∫
nN
φ(j)dj =
∫
nN
λ˜m(j)dj
is a measure of product quality for all products manufactured in the North,
ΦF ≡
∫
nF
φ(j)dj =
∫
nF
λ˜m(j)dj ,
is a measure of product quality for products manufactured by foreign affiliates and
ΦS =
∫
nS
φ(j)dj =
∫
nS
λ˜m(j)dj .
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is a measure of product quality for products manufactured by Southern firms. The
time derivative of ΦN is
Φ˙N =
∫
nN
(λ˜m(j)+1 − λ˜m(j)) h dj +
∫
nF+nS
λ˜m(j)+1 h dj −
∫
nN
λ˜m(j) ℓ dj
= (λ˜− 1)hΦN + λ˜h(ΦF + ΦS)− ℓΦN ,
the time derivative of ΦF is
Φ˙F =
∫
nN
λ˜m(j)ℓ dj −
∫
nF
λ˜m(j) h dj −
∫
nF
λ˜m(j) k dj = ℓΦN − hΦF − kΦF ,
and the time derivative of ΦS is
Φ˙S =
∫
nF
λ˜m(j)k dj −
∫
nS
λ˜m(j) h dj = kΦF − hΦS .
This implies the growth rates
Φ˙N/ΦN = (λ˜− 1)h+ λ˜hΦS/ΦN − k ,
Φ˙F/ΦF = ℓΦN/ΦF − h− k ,
and
Φ˙S/ΦS = kΦN/ΦS − h .
The growth rates of Φ, ΦN , ΦF and ΦS are constant over time only if ΦN/ΦS = λ˜h/k
and (due to Φ = ΦN + ΦF + ΦS)
ΦN =
λ˜h
λ˜h+ ℓ
Φ ; ΦF =
λ˜hℓ
(λ˜h+ k)(λ˜h+ ℓ)
Φ ; ΦS =
kℓ
(λ˜h+ k)(λ˜h+ ℓ)
Φ . (4.14)
Using (4.13), this implies
ΦN
nN
=
λ˜(h+ ℓ)
λ˜h+ ℓ
Φ >
ΦF
nF
=
λ˜(h+ k)(h+ ℓ)
(λ˜h+ k)(λ˜h + ℓ)
Φ >
ΦS
nS
=
(h+ k)(h + ℓ)
(λ˜h+ k)(λ˜h + ℓ)
Φ .
Thus, the average quality of products manufactured in the North is higher than
the average quality of products manufactured by Southern affiliates which in turn
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is higher than the average quality of products manufactured by competitive-fringe
firms in the South.
The Labor Markets
Full employment of labor prevails at each instant in time and wages adjust to equalize
labor demand and supply. Northern labor is employed in three activities: education,
production of consumer goods, and innovative research. It follows from (4.1) that
the aggregate demand for human capital in the Northern production sector is∫
nN
LNq (j)H
Ndj =
∫
nN
QN (j)dj = ΦN (pN)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) .
All industries are targeted by Northern firms engaged in innovative activities. It
follows from (4.4) that the aggregate demand for human capital in the Northern
research sector is∫ 1
0
LNh (j)H
Ndj =
∫ 1
0
µhφ(j)dj = µhΦ .
Thus, full employment of Northern workers implies that
LNHN = (1− ρ/κ)LNHN + Φ[λ˜h/(λ˜h+ ℓ)](pN)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS) + µhΦ .
(4.15)
Human capital of Southern workers can be employed in four activities: education,
production by foreign affiliates of multinational firms, adaptive research, and produc-
tion by Southern firms. It follows from (4.1) that the aggregate demand for human
capital in Southern production sector is∫
nF
LSq (j)H
Sdj =
∫
nF
QF (j)dj = ΦF (pF )−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS)
by the foreign affiliates and∫
nS
LSq (j)H
Sdj =
∫
nS
QS(j)dj = ΦS(wS)−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS)
by the competitive-fringe firms. Finally, it follows from (4.5) that the aggregate
demand for human capital in adaptive research is∫
nN
LSℓH
Sdj =
∫
nN
ηℓφ(j)dj = ηℓΦN .
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Thus, full employment of Southern workers implies that
LSHS = (1− ρ/κ)LSHS + [Φℓ/(λ˜h+ ℓ)][(pF )−
1
1−αP
α
1−α
C (I
NLN + ISLS)Ψ(k) + ηλ˜h] ,
(4.16)
where Ψ(k) ≡ (λ˜h+ ξk)/(λ˜h+ k); ξ(k) ≡ (1/α)1/(1−α) > 1, is increasing in the rate
of imitation, i.e. Ψ′(k) > 0.
The Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
To derive the factors explaining the technology-adaption rate ℓ, we substitute (4.9)
into (4.15) to obtain the Northern steady-state condition
ρ/κ =
µhΦ
LNHN
[
α
1− α
h+ κ− δ
λ˜h + ℓ
+ 1
]
(4.17)
and substitute (4.11) into (4.16) to obtain the Southern steady-state condition
ρ/κ =
ℓΦ
(λ˜h + ℓ)LSHS
[
α
1− α
(η + µω/λ˜)(h+ k + κ− δ)Ψ(k) + ηλ˜h
]
. (4.18)
In the balanced-growth equilibrium, the innovation and adaption rates, the relative
prices and wage rates and the ratios Φ/HN and Φ/HS are constant over time.
The products in each industry follow stochastic life cycles with different patterns. A
particular product might be improved several times in succession by various Northern
firms before it is adapted by a multinational firm. Then production shifts to the
South where the product is manufactured by the multinational firm an perhaps by
a competitive-fringe firm later on until being upgraded again by an innovative firm
in the North. An appropriate measure of the average length of a North-South cycle
is (1/ℓ + 1/h). The first term indicates how long, on average, a product will be
produced in the North before being adapted by a multinational firm, the second
term indicates how long, on average, a product will be manufactured in the South
before a further quality innovation occurs.
Globalization and Intellectual Property Rights
The steady-state equilibrium of the model enables us to derive some comparative-
static effects of globalization on the dynamics of innovation and adaption.
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As in the former model, an increase in size of the South has no impact on the long-run
innovation rate h∗. Comparative statics of (4.19) show that dℓ/dLS > 0. Southern
countries joining the world trading system have no direct effect on the Northern
steady-state condition (4.17), but imply that the ratio Φ/HS increases for a given
value of ℓ in the Southern steady-state condition (4.18). This generates a higher
steady-state rate of foreign direct investment ℓ and a higher steady-state value of
the ratio Φ/HS (or Φ/HN , respectively). The permanent increase in this ratio is
associated with a temporary increase in the innovation rate h above its steady-state
value h∗.
Proposition 5: Globalization measured by an increase in the size of the South leads
to a temporary increase in the innovation rate and to a permanent increase in the
adaption rate so that the average length of a North-South product cycle decreases.
Furthermore, the adaption rate ℓ depends on the exogenous imitation rate k, which
captures the effect of a stronger protection of the intellectual property rights, and
parameter η, which measures the difficulty of realizing a technology transfer within a
multinational firm. Comparative statics of (4.19) show that dℓ/dk < 0 and dℓ/dη <
0. A decrease in the imitation rate k has no direct effect on the Northern steady-
state condition (4.17), but implies that Φ/HS increases for a given value of ℓ in the
Southern steady-state condition (4.18). The latter effect works directly and through
a reduction in the North-South wage gap ω as determined in (4.12). This generates a
higher steady-state rate of foreign direct investment ℓ and a higher steady-state value
of the ratio Φ/HS (or Φ/HN , respectively). The permanent increase in this ratio is
associated with a temporary increase in the innovation rate h above its steady-state
value h∗. A reduction of η, implying less costly opportunities for multinational firms
to transfer technologies to Southern affiliates, induces comparative-static effects in
the same direction.
Proposition 6: Stronger protection of intellectual property rights measured by a de-
cline in the imitation rate of the competitive fringe in the South leads to a temporary
increase in the innovation rate and to a permanent increase in the rate of technol-
ogy transfer to the South within multinational firms. Improved conditions for foreign
direct investment, measured by a decrease in the difficulty for multinational firms to
transfer technology to the South generates similar steady-state equilibrium effects.
Improved conditions for foreign direct investment provide additional incentives for
34
multinational firms to increase their adaptive R&D activities and transfer produc-
tion to the lower-wage South faster. The more rapid international technology transfer
in turn increases the demand for Southern human capital employed in adaptive re-
search and decreases the demand for human capital in Northern production. These
two effects cause a permanent decline in the North-South wage gap and make it
more attractive for firms to engage in innovative R&D in the North. Northern firms
respond by innovating more frequently such that the difficulty of realizing innova-
tions rises at a higher than usual rate. This increase causes the innovation rate to
gradually slow down and to converge to the long-run innovation rate again.
A comparison of the results of this innovation-adaption model to those of the
innovation-imitation model analyzed above shows that the mode of international
technology transfer is crucial. When technology transfer occurs through imitation of
Northern products, stronger intellectual property rights lead to a temporary decrease
in the innovation rate and to a permanent increase in the North-South wage gap.
The opposite holds when technology transfer is driven by foreign direct investment.
In the real world, technology transfer occurs both, within multinational firms via
foreign direct investment and across rival firms via imitation. This leads Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2010, p. 15) to conjecture that the total effect depends on how im-
portant each mode of technology transfer is. We agree that the two mechanisms of
imitation and adaption complement each other. In order to assess the combined ef-
fect of both transfer mechanisms, Sener (2006) has attempted to formulate a unified
model. Unfortunately, such a generalized model is no longer analytically solvable.
Nevertheless, his numerical solutions are in accordance with the results derived in
the more restrictive models analyzed in this paper.
5 Summary and Conclusion
We have presented a class of dynamic general-equilibrium models of education, in-
novation and international technology transfer to explain the dynamics of industrial
evolution and aggregate growth. Recent semi-endogenous models of closed and open
economies have accomplished a valuable task by removing the scale effect present
in endogenous growth models of the first generation. A disturbing property of these
non-scale models is, however, that the innovation and per-capita growth rates de-
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pend proportionally on population growth. This property is clearly at odds with the
empirical evidence.
We have offered an alternative interpretation of labor by pointing out the impor-
tance of education and human-capital accumulation. The skill acquisition of workers
has not only a direct effect on economic growth but also an indirect effect via an
acceleration of the innovation processes. The effectiveness of the educational system
is therefore most important for the dynamics of innovation and growth. The scale
effect is eliminated by the assumption that the realization of innovations becomes
more difficult as the products climb up the quality ladders, but this deterioration
of technological opportunities is compensated by an improvement of the workers’
skills. Education and innovation appear as the two in-line engines of endogenous
scale-invariant growth.
The industrial dynamics induced by innovation and international technology transfer
correspond to those derived by the semi-endogenous growth models. Globalization by
Southern countries joining the world trading system lead to a temporary increase of
the innovation rates and to a permanent increase in the imitation or adaption rates.
The effects of stronger intellectual property rights depend crucially on the mode of
international technology transfer. In case of imitation across rival firms, stronger
protection induces a temporary decrease in innovation and a higher North-South
wage gap. In case of technology adaption within multinational firms the opposite
holds.
As several empirical studies have pointed out, both modes of international technol-
ogy transfer are important. Our results concerning technology adaption via foreign
direct investment describe the dynamics in the consumer electronics industry and
the office machinery industry since the 1960s very well. However, more recently the
rapid advances in the technological capabilities of engineers in the newly industrial-
ized (Southern) countries have made imitation an even more important channel for
international technology transfer. In the personal computer industry, for instance,
product cycles have been characterized not only by increasing offshore production by
multinational firms which originally developed the computers, but also by imitations
realized by competitors in the less developed South. The copies themselves, however,
have again been replaced by superior computers and laptops developed by Northern
firms. This evidence suggests the formulation of more general models appropriate to
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analyze the different modes of technology transfer within a single unified framework.
This challenging task is left for future research.
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